The Limitedless Market
I've been hiding under some stone, which has kept the wit of Ramchandra Guha safely hidden from my knowledge. An email this morning managed to rectify this gross shortcoming in my education. [Update: Thank you Makarand.]
In a piece in The Telegraph, Guha proposes an interesting theory about why Indian intellectuals hold markets in disdain:
My own theory about Indian economists is more specific and hopefully less facetious. It runs as follows; Gujarati economists place faith in the market, while Bengali economists are prone to trust the state. In the Fifties, when P.C. Mahalonobis drafted the Soviet-inspired second five year plan, A.D. Shroff responded by starting the Forum of Free Enterprise. In the Sixties and the Seventies, about the only economist of pedigree advocating Indian integration with the world economy was the Gujarati, Jagdish Bhagwati. He was opposed by an array of Marxists, many of whom (naturally) were Bengali.On a broader level this issue has been addressed (but perhaps not satisfactorily tackled), by intellectual heavy weights like Ludwig von Mises in "Anti-Capitalistic Mentality", Friedrich von Hayek in "The Intellectuals and Socialism" and Robert Nozick in "Why do Intellectuals oppose Capitalism?". There is also a Mises Institute commentary here.
Guha's theory is amusingly similar to the Commanding Heights documentary that proposes a clash of ideas. He takes it a step further Indianising the concept to identify the ideas closely with communities. Presenting the clash of ideas as a conflict of attitude between different ethnic groups, playing on well-worn stereotypes of cosmopolitan India. I am always amused at how intellectuals use stereotypes in public discourse (or is it discord).
My own theory of attitude of intellectuals is that the market is too big to control, so massive that it can't be understood in conventional frames of thought too caught up with the overt symptoms to delve into the underlying framework. If it can't be easily controlled, or easily understood, it evokes fear. This fear prompts calls for regulation and state intervention. I wish it prompted a fresh look at the frames of thought. Alas...
That aside, the main object of interest and disagreement I have with Guha's otherwise pro-market piece is his attempt to hold the middle ground with a very weak argument:
The market does have its imperfections. One is that left to itself, it tends to pollute and degrade the environment. A second is that employers generally do not pay attention to the health and safety of the worker. A third is that without consumer vigilance and action, industrialists do not always deliver on quality. A fourth is that the market disregards those without purchasing power. A fifth is that one cannot rely on the market to deliver on goods and services whose value cannot be reduced to monetary terms, such as primary education and basic healthcare.The limits he perceives are at best a product of ignorance and at worst, conviction. All five points are perhaps illustrative of the problem that will face the Bengali intellectual of Guha's cosmology once he/she overcomes his/her disdain of the market. The challenge is to look beyond the obvious symptoms which are easily attributed to the market and to the underlying regulatory framework within which it functions.
All the objections he lists are founded on the mistaken notion that the market is some independent autonomous entity. In more virulent mythology it is perhaps controlled by a cartel or a syndicate managed by a group of scheming capitalists.
We are the market! If only intellectuals realise and understand that our anonymous interactions with people we will never meet are the driving force of this wonderful spontaneous institution perhaps such popular mythology would be dispensed.
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For those with the patience to read I have refuted each of the 5 points he raises, below:
1. The Market tends to degrade and pollute the environment.
This is true of our current situation where a lot of property is owned by no one at all. Of course the title lies with government, but ownership also means active management. The public perception of rivers, lakes, air etc. as public property also prevents any specific members of the public from taking responsibility for them.
Say the Ganga belonged to the Ganga River Cooperative, whose stakeholders were the people living along the river. They would be able to charge the Mathura oil refinery for the chemicals it pours into the river. This would force the refinery to think through the technology it uses, so that it can minimize the pollution charges.
Blaming the market for pollution caused by the government's insistence on maintaining its control over the environment is more than a little unfair.
2. Employers don't pay attention to the health and safety of workers.
This varies. There are industries in which workers get the short shrift. However the regulation of industrial employment, through imposed health and safety standards raises the cost of doing business, and would perhaps have a negative effect on the industries ability to hire more workers.
The group of employers worst affected are start-ups and small businesses, for whom such regulation would just raise the entry barriers. If new competitors do not emerge for the existing pool of labour the large established employers will likely find ways to cut corners on health and safety.
In industries and professions where companies compete with each other for the best talent, employees come out the winners. Software companies and call centers are classic examples. The best workers protection is minimum entry barriers for employers, competition and technological progress.
3. Consumer vigilance and the quality of output
Consumer vigilance is important, but competitive pressure is far more potent force keeping quality and standards high across industries.
The simplest instance I know of is the dramatic improvements in quality at my local pani puri shops. Initially there was only one shop, which served the standard fare. Then shop next door noticing the traffic, started its own stall. Over the next 12 months there was a dramatic series of quality improvements. When I last visited the stall, apart from embellishment to the product the pani puri walas had uniforms and put on disposable plastic gloves, while the stuffing was covered in cling film. There was no consumer movement for better pani puri.
The threat of business going elsewhere causes producers to compete on quality, without any consumer vigilance. The problem with vigilance movements is that they will tend to suffer from the problems of rational ignorance. Most of the time people just wouldn't care enough to go out and act politically or civically. They would just switch to using another product. So the best consumer protection and quality assurance is competing producers.
4. Markets disregard those without purchasing power (i.e. the poor)
This is perhaps the most brutal misrepresentation of them all. Take the simple instance of drinking water in urban slums.
Two enterprising interns at CCS (Aditi Dimri and Amiya Sharma), spent 2 months walking around and observing Sanjay Colony a slum in South Delhi. They surveyed various aspects of the colony's economy, but their findings relating to water are pertinent here.
The Delhi Jal Board is responsible for the provision of water. However since the colony is illegal they can't provide taps in each house, because that would imply legalisation. Instead they send in tankers, which are assigned to individuals who are responsible for its distribution. This politically distributed water is insufficient and unsafe for drinking. So where does Sanjay Colony get its sip of water? Small sachets of water sold for Re. 1 each. Here is the market explicitly creating solutions for those with "limited purchasing power".
There are innumerable products ranging from water, to primary education to health care to shampoos, cold creams and telephones (here I am thinking of the PCO) that are packaged and priced especially for the poor. The real question is why are the poor poor? The answer will lie in the regulatory framework that continues to strangle their lives, a framework supported by unjust laws that empower and enable corruption.
5. The market doesn't provide primary education and primary health care
A quick glance at Aditi and Amiya's paper on Sanjay Colony will disabuse the reader of this myth as well. But it is important to get into a few specifics just to know how badly off the mark this statement is.
The most comprehensive work here is done by James Tooley, who has looked at instances around the world where private schools provide access to primary education to the poor for a price. The standards are not the greatest in the world, but often exceed free government schools, and parents are willing to pay to secure their children's future.
The problem here again is regulatory. In Delhi most private primary schools providing education to the poor are unrecognised. This means that children going to these schools have a tough time moving into secondary education. The quality or access to government schools is often bad enough for parents to send their children to these unrecognized schools.
12 Comments:
In perfect agreement with the post... mail it to Guha too.
Gautam, the point "The challenge is to look beyond the obvious symptoms which are easily attributed to the market and to the underlying regulatory framework within which it functions." is well made. But I have one problem which you have not addressed: scale. Are the solutions scalable even in the face of market-friendly regulations?
Also, let us take 2 and 3 in the context of the localised examples that you offer.
Can you tell us more about where firms in the manufacturing industry have competed in terms of offering more health and safety? My hypothesis is that regulation and ngos have put more pressue on this than market forces. Cheaper technology has also helped.
And i think consumer vigilance is important. If I take the pani-puri example to the whole of Delhi, I am pretty sure competition must have had a miniscule effect. But consumer vigilance at an individual level or even a section of customers can have dramatic improvements. The Amazon reviews are one good example. I have accessed the site lots of times and bought quite a few books. Yet I am lazy to post a review or even affirm the "helpfulness" of a review. But the thousands of reviews out there by vigilant customers definitely gives important institutional feedback and does help the market.
4 is interesting. Perhaps Amartya Sen's famine thesis weighs on Guha's mind. There was a market but no purchasing power and that led to the famine.
Somehow I am not convinced by your arguments of the market regulating itself.
There is always need of a regulatory body for protecting the environment and the consumers.
Remember Ralph Nader ? or the FDA ?
What I like about your post is that it is balanced, and you don't rebuke the original post unconditionally. But I would slightly disagree with you about point 1. and 2. Whether markets actually pollute the environment is another point (history has many examples to support this contention though) but I don't really disagree that the philosophy of markets may include polluting the environment without regard for its repurcussions. The reason is that corporations always find it convenient to externalize costs, and polluting the environmental in profit-making ventures and then leaving it for others to clean up is a very efficient method (for the corporation) to externalize costs. There may be specific corporations which do pay attention to the environment, but in general, it won't ever be actually profitable for corporations to expend resources and money in cleaning up. So in general, polluting the environment is a philosophy that is surely accomodated and even necessary for corporations, when it can be and is often subsumed within the greater goal of profit making. Of course, this philosophy can change when the consumer demands such a change, but why will that happen except in some circumstances? I have similar thoughts about 2.
Hi Gautam
I agree with you that competition is the answer for several of the seeming imperfections of the market. But the problem is that markets tend to favor monopolies at several places. Such situations are called natural monopolies. One example is the providers of transport/network connectivity.
In the event of a natural monopoly, it becomes obligatory for the state to take over that sector.
The essence of a good economist lies in the skill at identifying natural monopolies. Mr. Guha didn't do such a bad job after all.
Naveen you raise interesting problems. I will return to them when I have collected my thoughts.
Ashutosh, I'll deal with the safety and health of workers with Naveen's objections. As far as the environment is concerned, it is not possible to exercise externalities unless there are unclear property rights. Both positive and negative externalities only exist because of that.
A common misunderstanding is that you can't apportion property rights over things such as air or water bodies or such things as bees pollinating flowers . If you ask me how they will be apportioned my answer would be I don't know, because they have never needed to be apportioned.
Land didn't need to be apportioned till agriculture came along... in an industrial society we have somehow resisted the development of property arrangements for what we see as community property. In the case of Honey bees and flowers, Hong Kong economist Steven N.C. Cheung has a famous paper which shows that in Washington state there are regular paid arrangements amongst bee-keepers and apple orchards for just that purpose.
Kiran, I don't think Mr. Guha has done a very good job of identifying monopolies. The only real monopolies are legal ones, those backed up by the power of force engendered in the state.
Transport/network connectivity is certainly not a universal natural monopoly. First of all there is inter-mode competition i.e. roads compete with railways compete with waterways compete with air travel.
I was going to write another post about airports in India. Where I'll raise some points regarding airport competition.
I do get your point, that natural monopolies can emerge, but unless they are backed up with a legal sanction, they attract competitors to they super-normal profit industries and over time they no longer remain monopolies. So a natural monopoly without a legal sanction does not remain one for long.
Thanks all of you for your comments. I'll try to tackle Naveen's point soon.
A common misunderstanding is that you can't apportion property rights over things such as air or water bodies or such things as bees pollinating flowers . If you ask me how they will be apportioned my answer would be I don't know, because they have never needed to be apportioned
Actually, unless someone comes up with a way of assigning property rights to air and water as you suggest, preventing environmental pollution through free markets are a flight of fancy. Specifically, consider global warming. C02 released into the air does not affect the "owners of that particular air" in any way. It affects coastal cities by causing dramatic rises in sea level etc. How exactly are free markets going to solve this problem? By abandoning coastal cities? Virtually all cities are on coasts. It is high time free marketeers realize that private property is not going to solve each and every problem of human kind. Your critique of Guha's piece is very poor.
Gautam, the Ganga example you gave makes your point, but how often is that really going to happen? Unless it does, the only way to limit pollution by free markets is by imposing some tax or some penalties, which the government can traditionally do. Like I said earlier, if people including shareholders also are concerned about pollution, then the responsibility of taxing markets in one way or the other can be taken up by them. I believe that Guha's statement was specific; he said "If left to themselves, free markets would pollute. I don't think that the statement is false with that qualifier. Of course, you can have a free market that pollutes relatively less, with government controls over it. What about the US, which has some of the most stringent pollution laws in the world and yet has the freest market in the world? (perhaps excepting Hong Kong). On the other hand, you also have the example of communist countries, which were some of the worst polluters in the world. My point is that both extremes are equally bad; it is in the interests of free markets to pollute if not doing it compromises on profits, which it usually does. Pollution is a very convenient way of externalising costs. I do agree with Anonymous that unless someone comes up with a way of assigning property rights to natural resources, we will need some government control on polluting corporations. But as many examples show, this will hardly curb their free market nature as such. So I don't think pro-free marketeers need to worry.
Ashutosh: My point is that free markets left to themselves would develop the necessary property rights and legal arrangements which will reduce pollution. The only thing the government need provide is a framework within which property rights are protected.
The term framework is crucial. The government interventions or solutions (taxation, confiscation etc.) are never neutral, they always have unintended and unforeseen consequences. The government or state should be restricted to providing a framework within which solutions are found.
That framework usually takes the form of the rule of law, and the protections of property rights.
Notice that all the subjects of pollution have no owners. If the property currently held by government but owned by no one were to be sold or transferred to the local stakeholders that would be a great starting point for people to start exerting their rights over the property.
If you think the Ganga case is unrealistic, take the instance of Rajinder Singh who mobilized a community to take ownership of a dead river in Rajasthan and used check dams to revitalize it. The only thing the government did was try to claim the river as government property once it was revitalized. The villagers resisted and were able to take control of the river. The property holder need not be a single person it could be a community or group who have a stake in the property.
The rivers died because of neglect, the Ganga is polluted because no one stands up and says it belongs to them and they want it to be clean... because no one owns it. I'd say the best Ganga bachao plan would be to setup a Ganga River Cooperative and give each person who lives along the river a stake in it.
I agree with you that markets might prevent pollution, if someone stands up and says that the natural resources belong to them and they are accorded the rights. But I still don't see why that would happen, if all the damage, as in Anonymous's CO2 scenario, is collateral. I am thinking if one could actually implement such a policy on a large scale. Can you think of the people of some Polynesian island being stakeholders in Exxon Mobile? Also, it's a well known fact that industry has powerful lobbyists who would fight against implementing any such property rights; after all, pollution is profitable for them. And I also think that there are two points here with subtle differences. Guha's original point seems to be that it is in the nature of markets to pollute and externalize costs. I don't think it will be difficult to disagree with this. The other point is whether we can actually have a free market that is left to itself, which will develop the necessary property rights as you say. The two examples you have given are not bad, but I don't think in general that this is true. In the US, many corporations left to themselves did pollute and there seemed to be no property right enforcement by anyone in sight. The government did need to intervene. In the US, drinking water for example, is still largely controlled by the government and it's not causing problems. I also think that the enforcement of property rights depends on the legal systems naturally; people who are directly affected by pollution will have a great incentive and common voice to secure property rights. It also depends upon the just and transperant nature of the justice system. How many people who But what about the people who are indirectly affected? I guess the real point I am getting at is whether what you say can be realistically done and whether it has been done on a global scale historically. I don't believe so. So even if the government provides a framework for property rights, if the market keeps on polluting true to its nature, should nobody do anything at all?
My guess is that as the effects of pollution/global warming become pernicious enough, even shareholders may start demanding clean industrial processes. But it would be silly to wait till that happens and not have any government legislation on pollution till then. But I again say that I don't think government taxation of pollution is necessarily detrimental to free markets. The reason is that corporations usually find that even paying the tax and continuing their processes is more profitable than converting all their processes to environmental friendly ones. But on another note, I want to ask you, if creating ownership of natural resources was really the solution, why has it not been implemented yet even in pro free market economies? The logistics to me seems extremely complicated.
The bottom line I think, is that enforcing such property rights on a large scale may be logistically impossible. On a short scale, it might be possible. In any case, it does not make sense to simply wait until any such system comes into being. The key factor in environmental pollution is time, something that may not factor in in other decisions. And we don't have much time.
we are the market
Bah! I thought we are the govt.
Wonder if its too late to write about this, but came across your post rather late. Your rebuttal to Guha's 4th point is
based on very specious argumentation. The reasons I shall list
1) If the particular colony under survey is indeed illegal, the government is not required to provide it water in the first place. Here, you bring up the example of this colony because you think it suits your case, at some other place, free-marketeer who supports lower taxation may easily have brought it up as a case of 'where your taxes go - subsidising illegal colonies' water supply'. Drinking water is a touchy issue, almost everyone believes that everyone should have access to clean drinking water. So, I'm assuming that irrespective of your beliefs on the market, you believe that these people somehow deserve clean drinking water, illegal housing notwithstanding. I agree with your assumption, and so will go on to point 2.
2) The 'small sachets' of water that you mention are actually of 250 ml. at Rs 1 per sachet, it works out to rs 4 per litre. Do not for a moment believe that this represents 'limited purchasing power'. I belong to a family that cannot be described as 'low purchasing power' by any means, and we buy drinking water at rs 20/ 20 litre bottle, or rs 1/ litre, owing to the high TDS value of the ground water in the area that I live in. I can assure you that any family of 'limited purchasing power' cannot afford to meet its daily requirement of drinking/cooking water at the rate of Rs 4 / litre. The reason that they can buy these sachets inspite of being families of limited means is that the Delhi Jal Board comes with the tankers of 'insufficient, unsafe' water, and so only a small part of the daily requirements are met by the sachets. If the DJB was to pull out completely, the market wouldn't miraculously step up overnight to benefit the residents of Sanjay Colony, they would simply have to fork out more for their water, and the ones among them who have the least purchasing power would indeed have to settle for lesser water than they require, like Guha says. Also, please do not compare the 1 re sachet of water with the 1 re shampoo. Drinking water is a public good.
3) This is tangential to the issue, but I couldn't resist. It is interesting to note your choice of the adjective 'unsafe for drinking' to describe the water suplied by the DJB and to not talk about the hygiene issues of the water in the sachets. A lot of these sachets are made of plastic that is being re-used after being collected by rag-pickers from railways tracks, dust-bins etc. The market is probably covering up for the insufficiency, in no way however is it ensuring the hygiene. I would say your choice of terms is a classic case of selective argumentation.
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